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Abstract
In this paper we derive a theorem which proves that the physical inter-
pretation implied by the first postulate of quantum mechanics (QM)
is inconsistent with the orthodox formalism. In order to expose this
inconsistency we will analyze how the concept of ‘physical system’ is
built within classical theories through the notion of invariance and
explain in what sense a vector in Hilbert space is not capable of fulfill-
ing these same mathematical conditions. Through an analysis of the
mathematical formalism we derive a No Dynamical Invariance (NDI)
theorem which proves that, contrary to what is claimed in the first
postulate, a vector in Hilbert space cannot be interpreted coherently
as the state of a physical (quantum) system. We conclude the paper by
analyzing the consequences of the NDI theorem with respect to several
ongoing debates in QM.
Keywords: state, physical reality, invariance, quantum contextuality.
1 Introduction
The interpretation of states (vectors in Hilbert space) in quantum mechanics
(QM) is still today, one of the most controversial fields of debate in both
physics and philosophy of physics. As remarked in a recent paper [29, p.
475]: “Quantum states are the key mathematical objects in quantum the-
ory. It is therefore surprising that physicists have been unable to agree on
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what a quantum state truly represents.” In this paper we will argue that
the kernel of this debate stands, quite paradoxically, on a fundamental idea
—introduced by the first postulate of orthodox quantum theory— which is
simply untenable, namely, that a vector can be interpreted as the state of a
physical (quantum) system. Unfortunately, this assumption has been taken
for granted in many discussions and analysis regarding the interpretation
of QM. In particular, it is assumed by Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph in or-
der to prove their no-go theorem about the ‘reality of the quantum state’.
According to the so called PBR theorem:
“[...] if the quantum state merely represents information about the real
physical state of a system, then experimental predictions are obtained
which contradict those of quantum theory. The argument depends
on few assumptions. One is that a system has a ‘real physical state’
not necessarily completely described by quantum theory, but objective
and independent of the observer. This assumption only needs to hold
for systems that are isolated, and not entangled with other systems.
Nonetheless, this assumption, or some part of it, would be denied by
instrumentalist approaches to quantum theory, wherein the quantum
state is merely a calculational tool for making predictions concerning
macroscopic measurement outcomes.” [29, p. 475]
We will show that this assumption should not only be denied by instrumen-
talist approaches but also by anyone who accepts or takes as a standpoint
the orthodox formalism of QM. Jonathan Barrett has made the point that:
“People have become emotionally attached to positions that they defend
with vague arguments, it’s better to have a theorem.” [30, p. 157] We
certainly agree on both points. There is indeed a widespread misuse of
basic physical concepts —e.g. ‘state’, ‘system’, ‘physical reality’, etc.— re-
sponsible for a proliferation of undefined and vague problems within the
foundational literature regarding QM. In order to expose this state of affairs
we will put forward a physical argumentation based on the notion of invari-
ance which will allow us to develop a No Value Invariance (NDI) Theorem
which proves that interpreting a vector in Hilbert space as ‘the physical state
of a (quantum) system’ is inconsistent with the mathematical formalism of
QM. We will argue that this misinterpretation has played a significant role
in stopping the theory from going beyond the metaphysics of actual entities
and finding a coherent physical interpretation.
The stance we will assume in order to develop our argument is that,
while physics attempts to describe the world and physical reality, pure math-
ematics is a non-representational discipline which is not constrained by the
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physical world nor experience. Mathematics is a language which needs no
reference. We take mathematics to be a discipline which remains at dis-
tance from metaphysical considerations, the only judge it accepts is its own
internal coherency. Only when interpreted and related to experience, pure
mathematics escapes the safety of speculation and deduction and becomes
part of a physical theory. But in general, due to its non-representational
character formal mathematical structures have no “minimal interpretation”,
or in other words, there is no “self evident” path to follow from a specific
mathematical formalism into a physical theory.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we analyze the ortho-
dox formalism of QM and its metaphysical underpinnings which, we claim,
appear from the choice of the concepts used in order to express the main pos-
tulates of the theory. Section 3 compares the invariance of classical theories
to the contextual character of QM. In section 4 we continue to analyze the
orthodox mathematical structure of QM and derive a NDI Theorem which
proves that the interpretation of a vector in Hilbert space in terms of the
state of a physical system is inconsistent with the formalism of the theory.
In section 5, we discuss the consequences of the NDI theorem with respect
to several ongoing debates in the literature. Finally, in section 6 we present
some final remarks.
2 The Orthodox Quantum Formalism and its Meta-
physical Underpinnings
The orthodox formalism of QM is constructed within a vectorial Hilbert
space. As we shall see in this section, this mathematical structure has been
interpreted, from the very origin of the theory, following —implicitly— cer-
tain basic preconceptions of Newtonian physics. Although the formalism
has shown many problems when interpreted under these lines, certain main
ideas have remained present in all interpretations of QM. Hidden within
language, the metaphysics of entities and actuality has prevailed up to the
present. In the following section we shall firstly describe the mathemati-
cal structure of the theory, and secondly, we will expose the metaphysical
underpinnings that have restricted the development of QM.
Let us begin by providing a mathematical account of the theory. First,
we give the definition of Hilbert spaces and dimension using sets and func-
tions. A complex vector space H is a set with two algebraic structures
satisfying the following axioms,
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1. λ(x+ y) = (λx) + (λy), ∀λ ∈ C, x, y ∈ H.
2. (λ1 + λ2)x = (λ1x) + (λ2x), ∀λ1, λ2 ∈ C, x ∈ H.
3. (λ1λ2)x = λ1(λ2x), ∀λ1, λ2 ∈ C, x ∈ H.
4. 1x = x, ∀x ∈ H.
The most common example of a complex vector space is Cn, where n is a
positive integer, n ∈ N. The elements x ∈ H of a complex vector space H
are called vectors, usually denoted |x〉. A linear morphism from a complex
vector space H1 to another complex vector space H2 is a function f : H1 →
H2 such that
1. f(x+ y) = f(x) + f(y), ∀x, y ∈ H1.
2. f(λx) = λf(x), ∀λ ∈ C, x ∈ H1.
We say that the linear morphism f is an isomorphism if f is bijective. A
finite-dimensional complex vector space H is a complex vector space iso-
morphic to Cn for some n ∈ N. The number n is called the dimension of H.
We say that the pair (H, 〈−|−〉) is a finite dimensional Hilbert space if H is
a finite dimensional complex vector space and 〈−|−〉 is an inner product in
H. An inner product in H is a function 〈−|−〉 : H×H → C satisfying,
1. 〈x|y〉 = 〈y|x〉, ∀x, y ∈ H.
2. 〈λ1x1 + λ2x2|y〉 = λ1〈x1|y〉+ λ2〈x2|y〉, ∀λ1, λ2 ∈ C, x1, x2, y ∈ H.
3. 〈x|x〉 > 0, ∀x 6= 0, x ∈ H.
As an example, Cn with the usual inner product, 〈v|w〉 = ∑ni=1 viwi, is a
Hilbert space of dimension n.
As we argued above, a mathematical formalism does not provide in it-
self an interpretation of its terms. In particular, a vector in Hilbert space
does not have any self evident physical interpretation whatsoever. And since
mathematics does not attempt to capture a representation of the world, a
“minimal interpretation” always hides a particular “metaphysical interpre-
tation”. Unfortunately, there is in the literature such a “minimal interpre-
tation” accepted —either implicitly or explicitly— by the vast majority of
the community which, we will argue, is not only inconsistent but also closes
the doors to a proper discussion and analysis of the metaphysical principles
under consideration.
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The most important metaphysical claim regarding the formalism of QM
is found in the very first postulate of the theory which assumes the contro-
versial fact that vectors describe ‘states of physical (quantum) systems’.
POSTULATE I: A vector in Hilbert space represents the physical state of
a quantum system.
This is indeed, the very origin of a strong metaphysical interpretation im-
posed on QM. As remarked by Michel Bitbol [5, p. 72]: “The tendency to
reify state vectors manifests itself in the use of the very word ‘state’. The
‘grammar’ (in Wittgenstein’s sense) of the word ‘state’ requires that this is
the state of something; that it belongs to something; that it characterizes
this something independently of anything else. Such grammar, and the con-
ception associated to it, is sufficient to generate one of the major aspects
of the measurement problem.” Indeed, concepts allow us to think, they
are not just words. Physical theories are constituted by a net of physical
concepts, and it is these same concepts which allow us to configure physical
experience, think about phenomena and even create new experiments. Clas-
sical mechanics, for example, was created not only through mathematical
calculus but also through the notions of absolute space and time developed
by Newton. Also the concept of field appears as necessary in order to un-
derstand Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. As Heisenberg makes the point
[23, p. 264]: “The history of physics is not only a sequence of experimental
discoveries and observations, followed by their mathematical description; it
is also a history of concepts. For an understanding of the phenomena the
first condition is the introduction of adequate concepts. Only with the help
of correct concepts can we really know what has been observed.”
Nonetheless, in QM there is an accepted discourse used by the commu-
nity, constituted by vaguely defined ‘common phrases’, that has silently cap-
tured the theory within a specific metaphysical stance. For example, when
discussing the interpretation, the orthodox view assumes that QM talks
about “quantum particles”, but the use of such concept limits the possibil-
ity itself of analysis, for the notion of “particle” is not empty of metaphysical
commitments that we accept willingly or not when arguing under the accep-
tance of such linguistic standpoint. Some, who know of the inconveniences
of the use of such concept in order to refer to the formalism, argue that “this
is just a way of talking”, and immediately add: “but we all know that QM
does not talk about particles!” We regard this contradiction in the use and
meaning of language as very pernicious for a proper analysis and discussion
of the presuppositions needed in order to coherently interpret the theory.
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This is not “just a way of talking” for the acceptance of a language implies
constraints to the questions and problems that might be consistently posed.
In particular, the notions of ‘state’ and ‘system’ have played a significant
role in limiting the discussions regarding the interpretation of QM.
According to the orthodox interpretation, states of a quantum system
are represented by normalized vectors of H and observables by self-adjoint
operators A. The spectral theorem asserts that to any self-adjoint opera-
tor A in an n-dimensional Hilbert space there exists an orthonormal basis
{x1, . . . , xn} consisting of eigenvectors of A such that:
A =
n∑
i=1
ai|xi〉〈xi|, ai ∈ R.
The possible results of the measurement of a (sharp) magnitude are the
eigenvalues ai of its associated operator A. So observables may be decom-
posed to give an exhaustive and exclusive partition of the possible alterna-
tives for the results of measurements. The probability to obtain one of them
in an experimental procedure is given by the Born rule. Given a vector
x ∈ H, it is possible to write x as a linear combination of the orthonormal
basis {x1, . . . , xn},
|x〉 =
n∑
i=1
λi|xi〉, λi = 〈x|xi〉.
The coefficients (λ1, . . . , λn) appearing in this expression are called the co-
ordinates of x in the basis {x1, . . . , xn}.
From a physical perspective, the notions of ‘state’ and ‘system’ used
within QM imply the presupposition that we are discussing about an in-
dividual physical entity. This was indeed the first intuition of the early
atomic theory which found its origin in the Democritean theory of atoms.
As pointed out by Heisenberg:
“The strongest influence on the physics and chemistry of the past
[19th] century undoubtedly came from the atomism of Democritos.
This view allows an intuitive description of chemical processes on a
small scale. Atoms can be compared with the mass points of Newtonian
mechanics, and from this a satisfactory statistical theory of heat was
developed. [...] the electron, the proton, and possibly the neutron
could, it seemed, be considered as the genuinee atoms, the indivisible
building blocks, of matter.” [8, p. 218]
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At the beginning of the last century the founding fathers started their dis-
cussions about the meaning of such atoms (or quantum particles) but it
soon became clear, that the notion of particle didn’t coherently fit what the
formalism was describing. Unfortunately, the first postulate is evidence of
the paradoxical triumph —even in QM— of the metaphysics of entities and
actuality.
Of course, the notion of actual entity has been, since the origin of modern
science, the main notion of physics. Even though the notion of entity was
conceived by Aristotle in terms of three logical and ontological principles of
existence, non-contradiction and identity, it was only in modern science that
Newton was able to develop a mathematical formalism in order to deal with
them (see for discussion [13, 17]). This development allowed to interpret
a point in phase space as a physical object in (Newtonian) space-time. A
physical system or entity was then conceived in terms of a set of definite val-
ued properties. Even though one could observe such physical objects from
different perspectives or reference frames the possibility to translate these
views through the Galilean transformations secured the possibility of con-
sidering the measurement of subjects as external to a preexistent (objective)
physical reality. Although it might be argued that this notion worked fairly
well in order to develop physical theories, with the creation of QM many
problems started to appear.
Indeed, until QM we could claim that all physics talked about some
type of entity: particles, waves, rigid bodies, fields, etc., or even in more
general terms, of an actual state of affairs. The notion of actual entity has
been a conceptual construction which allowed us to deal with experience for
more than three centuries, but just like the notion of field was physically
developed and formally shaped in order to deal with new electromagnetic
phenomena that could not be explained by Newtonian mechanics, it is not
obvious nor self evident that we must presuppose a specific metaphysical
scheme in order to interpret the quantum formalism. Unfortunately, the
main discussions in the literature —following implicitly the first postulate—
presuppose the notion of entity, producing specific interpretational problems
which take for granted this particular metaphysical standpoint. Obviously,
such problems cannot escape their own presuppositions, and exactly be-
cause of this reason, QM has been confined to a discussion within the limits
of this very specific metaphysical stance. Since this discussion places the
solution to the interpretation at the origin —by assuming that we know
what QM talks about—, the analysis which assumes such standpoint has
only a negative perspective towards the theory. As a consequence the prob-
lems of QM are: non-locality, non-commutativity, non-ditributivity, non-
7
idividuality, non-separability, etc.1 Even worse, forcing the metaphysics of
entities and actuality into the contextual quantum formalism has created the
most weird mixture between subjective and objective aspects in a physical
theory ever. As Janes makes the point:
“[O]ur present [quantum mechanical] formalism is not purely epis-
temological; it is a peculiar mixture describing in part realities of Na-
ture, in part incomplete human information about Nature —all scram-
bled up by Heisenberg and Bohr into an omelette that nobody has seen
how to unscramble. Yet we think that the unscrambling is a prerequi-
site for any further advance in basic physical theory. For, if we cannot
separate the subjective and objective aspects of the formalism, we can-
not know what we are talking about; it is just that simple.” [24, p.
381]
We will argue that the orthodox interpretation of vectors as ‘physical sys-
tems’ is not only hiding a strong metaphysical commitment, but is, more im-
portantly, simply inconsistent with the formalism of QM. A vector in Hilbert
space escapes the structural constraints imposed by the metaphysical prin-
ciples that determine the notion of physical entity. Thus the unscrambling
of the subjective from the objective will have to do, first of all, with the
abandonment of an improper metaphysical scheme dogmatically forced into
the formalism of the theory. In the following section we will show that the
invariance —a main notion that allows physical theories to account for an
objective description of reality— that appears in QM is not consistent with
the orthodox interpretation. The main point we will prove in this paper is
that even though a vector is an invariant, it is not a mathematical invariant
of the kind needed to provide an interpretation such as the one provided by
the first postulate.
3 Classical Invariance vs Quantum Contextuality
In classical physics, every physical system may be described exclusively by
means of its actual properties, taking “actuality” as expressing the preex-
istent mode of being of the properties themselves, independently of obser-
vation —the “pre” referring to its existence previous to measurement. The
evolution of the system may be described by the change of its actual prop-
erties. Mathematically, the state is represented by a point (p; q) in the
1We want to thank Bob Coecke for this linguistic characterization of the orthodox
problems of QM presently discussed in the literature.
8
correspondent phase space Γ and, given the initial conditions, the equation
of motion tells us how this point moves in Γ. Physical magnitudes are rep-
resented by real functions over Γ. These functions can be all interpreted
as possessing definite values at any time, independently of physical observa-
tion. Thus, as mentioned above, each magnitude can be interpreted as being
actually preexistent to any possible measurement without conflicting with
the mathematical formulation of the theory. In this scheme, speaking about
potential or possible properties usually refers to functions of the points in
Γ to which the state of the system might arrive to in a future instant of
time; these points, in turn are also completely determined by the equations
of motion and the initial conditions.
In QM, contrary to the classical scheme, physical magnitudes are rep-
resented by operators on H that, in general, do not commute. This math-
ematical fact has extremely problematic interpretational consequences for
it is then difficult to affirm that these quantum magnitudes are simultane-
ously preexistent (i.e., objective). In order to restrict the discourse to sets of
commuting magnitudes, different Complete Sets of Commuting Operators
(CSCO) have to be (subjectively) chosen. In QM, contrary to the classical
case, this (subjective) choice determines explicitly what is to be considered
(objectively) real. This feature of the theory is known in the literature as
quantum contextuality. Here is were the mixing of the objective and the
subjective takes place. Indeed, the way to solve this uncomfortable situa-
tion within the orthodox perspective is to introduce a subjective choice —in
between the many contexts— that reintroduces superficially the classical
structure (see for discussion [12]). This ad hoc move which mixes the sub-
jective with the objective has never been physically justified. Even the most
accepted candidate to account for this interpretational maneuver, namely
the principle of decoherence, has failed to provide a convincing physical ex-
planation [1, 21]. The idea that one needs to choose (subjectively) a context
in order to determine which are the (objective) observables that have defi-
nite values violates explicitly counterfactual reasoning (see for example [2])
which is maybe the most important feature of physical description itself —a
feature which allows us to go beyond the discourse about mere measure-
ment outcomes. The violation of counterfactual reasoning goes against the
basic tenet of physical realism which claims that physics describes a world of
which we humans are part, an objective world independent of consciousness
or subjective human interventions. As a consequence, those who give up
on counterfactual reasoning also give up on the possibility of an objective
physical description of reality.
Starting from “common sense” classical realism instead of staring from
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the formalism of the theory —which has already proven to be empirically
adequate—, quantum contextuality has been considered in the literature
as related to the problem of taking into account incompatible experimental
arrangements. However, due to their invariance, vectors have seemed to
escape this problematic situation. As a matter of fact, the first postulate
of QM has remained a basic standpoint for the foundational problems and
questions addressed within the literature. Indeed, most problems start their
argumentation —e.g. the PBR theorem, the problem of non-individuality,
the problem of non-separability, the problem of non-locality— assuming
the validity of the first postulate. In this paper we will prove that such
physical interpretation is inconsistent with the orthodox formalism of QM.
This inconsistency has to do with a basic limitation of physical invariance
within quantum theory.
As remarked by Max Born [6]: “the idea of invariant is the clue to
a rational concept of reality, not only in physics but in every aspect of
the world.” The notion of invariance allows us to determine what is to
be considered the same. In physics, invariants are quantities having the
same value for any reference frame. The transformations that allow us to
consider the physical magnitudes from different frames of reference have the
property of forming a group. In the case of classical mechanics we have the
Galilei transformations which keep space and time apart, while in relativity
theory we have the Lorentz transformations which introduce an intimate
connection between space and time coordinates. Nomological properties are
the main invariants which classify the physical system under study. In QM,
nomological properties determine the classification of experience. Physicists
classify elementary particles in terms of their mass, spin and charge, naming
them according to their specific values as “electrons”, “protons”, “photons”,
etc. However, the description provided by such nomological properties is
completely static. Of course, what is really interesting for a physicist is not
what remains always the same (independently of the observer) but rather
what changes: the dynamics. Restricting ourselves to physical magnitudes
that remain always the same, independently of the reference frame, does
not provide a dynamical picture of the world, instead such description only
provides a static table of data. Obviously such description is completely
uninteresting for physics, which attempts to describe not only how the world
is but —far more importantly— how the world changes.
That which matters the most for physical description is the invariant
variations of physical magnitudes, that is, the dynamical magnitudes which
vary but can be considered still the same (e.g., position, velocity, momentum,
energy, etc.). The difference within the identity. Furthermore, in physics it
10
is not only important to consider magnitudes that vary with respect to a
definite reference frame (S), but also the consistent translation that allows us
to consider that same variation with respect to a different frame of reference
(S′). This relation (of the values between S and S′) is also provided via the
transformation laws. Such transformations include not only the dynamics
of the observables but also the dynamics between the different observers.
Even though the values of physical magnitudes might also vary from
one reference frame to the other —due to the dynamics between reference
frames—, in both classical physics and relativity theory there is a consistent
translation between the values of magnitudes of different frames secured by
the transformation laws. The position of a rabbit running through the fields
and observed by a distant passenger of a high speed train can be translated
to the position of that same rabbit taken from the perspective of another
passenger waiting in the platform of the station. The fact that the values of
observables (position, momentum, etc.) can be consistently translated from
one reference frame to the other allows us to assume that such physical
observables also bear an objective real existence completely independent of
the specific choice of the reference frame of the observes. The rabbit has a set
of dynamical properties (position, a momentum, etc.) independently of his
observers in the train and on the platform. The observables of the physical
system are independent of the observers. We can thus claim that such
properties are dynamical variations that pertain always to the same physical
system. In more general terms, it is exactly this formal aspect which allows
us to talk in terms of an Actual State of Affairs (ASA) that evolves in time;
i.e., a dynamical description in terms of the variation of (objective) definite
valued observables (or ‘dynamical properties’) independent of the (subjective
choice of the) perspective (or reference frame) from which they are being
observed.2 The same reasoning can be applied to coordinate transformations
in the phase space Γ. If we consider a set of observables in a coordinate
system, S, and perform a transformation of coordinates (e.g., a rotation) to
a new system, S′, then the values of the observables will be also consistently
translated from the system S to the system S′. Such consistency, which is
again secured by the transformation, is the objectivity condition which allows
us to consider the observables as preexistent to the choice of the coordinate
system.
At a more profound level, apart from characterizing the evolution of
systems, the dynamical properties are also responsible for allowing us to
2Even in relativity theory, due to the Lorentz transformations, one can still consider
‘events’ as the building blocks of physical reality.
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distinguish between different physical systems.3 As a matter of fact, with-
out dynamical properties, physicists would not be even able to distinguish
between physical systems that possess the same set of nomological proper-
ties. A physical description, without dynamics, would be a completely static
table of data with no reference to particular physical systems or individuals.
A physical system is necessarily described by its static (or nomological)
properties and by its dynamical properties. As argued above, a necessary
condition for claiming the reality of a physical system is that the valuation
of such properties needs to be consistent with respect to different reference
frames or coordinate transformations. Going now back to QM, since vectors
are (by definition) invariants under rotations, it makes good sense at first
sight to interpret a vector in Hilbert space as the state of an individual
physical system. As we shall see, there is a subtlety involved in the formalism
of QM which makes this interpretation untenable.
4 The No Dynamical Invariance Theorem
In QM the frames under which a vector is represented mathematically are
considered in terms of orthonormal bases. We say that a set {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆
H in an n-dimensional Hilbert space is an orthonormal basis if 〈xi|xj〉 = 0 for
all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n and 〈xi|xi〉 = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. A physical quantity is
represented by a self-adjoint operator on the Hilbert spaceH. We say that A
is a context ifA is a commutative subalgebra generated by a set of self-adjoint
bounded operators {A1, . . . , As} in H. Quantum contextuality, which was
most explicitly recognized through the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem [25],
asserts that a value ascribed to a physical quantity A cannot be part of
a global assignment of values but must, instead, depend on some specific
context from which A is to be considered. Let us see this with some more
detail.
Physically, a global valuation allows us to define the preexistence of
definite properties. Mathematically, a valuation over an algebra A of self-
adjoint operators on a Hilbert space, is a real function satisfying,
1. Value-Rule (VR): For any A ∈ A, the value v(A) belongs to the spec-
3This can be related to the notion of imprimitivity. As remarked by Castellani [8, p.
184]: “In the literature, the explicit use of the notion of imprimitivity system with regard
to the definition of a ‘particle’ is due especially to Piron [28]. The basic idea is to obtain
a definition of the particle by employing physical quantities or observables, such as for
example the position observable, through which the particle could be determined also as
an individual object.”
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trum of A, v(A) ∈ σ(A).
2. Functional Composition Principle (FUNC): For any A ∈ A and any
real-valued function f , v(f(A)) = f(v(A)).
We say that the valuation is a Global Valuation (GV) if A is the set of
all bounded, self-adjoint operators. In case A is a context, we say that
the valuation is a Local Valuation (LV). We call the mathematical property
which allows us to paste consistently together multiple contexts of LVs into
a single GV, Value Invariance (VI). First assume that a GV v exists and
consider a family of contexts {Ai}I . Define the LV vi := v|Ai over each
Ai. Then it is easy to verify that the set {vi}I satisfies the Compatibility
Condition (CC),
vi|Ai∩Aj = vj |Ai∩Aj , ∀i, j ∈ I.
The CC is a necessary condition that must satisfy a family of LVs in order
to determine a GV. We say that the algebra of self-adjoint operators is VI
if for every family of contexts {Ai}I and LVs vi : Ai → R satisfying the CC,
there exists a GV v such that v|Ai = vi.
If we have VI, and hence, a GV exists, this would allow us to give values
to all magnitudes at the same time maintaining a CC in the sense that
whenever two magnitudes shear one or more projectors, the values assigned
to those projectors are the same from every context. The KS theorem, in
algebraic terms, rules out the existence of GVs when the dimension of the
Hilbert space is greater than 2. The following theorem is an adaptation of
[16, Theorem 3.2] to the case of contexts:
Theorem 4.1 (KS Theorem) If H is a Hilbert space of dim(H) > 2, then
a global valuation is not possible. 
Let us analyze the case of a LV. Given a context A generated by a set of
pairwise commuting self-adjoint operators {A1, . . . , As} on H, it is possi-
ble to find an orthonormal basis {x1, . . . , xn} of common eigenvectors to
{A1, . . . , As}. Then, the context A is equal to the context generated by the
operators {|xi〉〈xi|}ni=1. Given an orthonormal basis {x1, . . . , xn}, we say
that v is a LV defined over the orthonormal basis {x1, . . . , xn} if v is a LV
over the context generated by {|x1〉〈x1|, . . . , |xn〉〈xn|}. The orthonormality
implies that the operators {|xi〉〈xi|}ni=1 are pairwise commuting. By VR,
the LV v satisfies,
v(|xi〉〈xi|) ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Then, there are 2n LV to any context.
Let us prove that the group of rotations in QM does not preserve valua-
tions in the same way as the transformation laws in classical mechanics and
relativity theory. In classical mechanics and relativity theory one can pred-
icate the truth of falsity of all the propositions with respect to the values
of all (static and dynamic) physical magnitudes. The algebra of observables
in both classical mechanics and relativity theory are commutative, hence
the notion of LV and GV coincide (LV ≡ GV). Even more, a change in the
reference frame —via a Galilean or a Lorentz transformation— or a coordi-
nate transformation in Γ preserves the CC. This implies that we can assign
a value to every observable simultaneously and in particular, we also have
VI. This formal aspect of classical mechanics and relativity theory allows us
to interpret physically both mathematical formalisms in terms of an ASA.
VI ⇐⇒ GV ⇐⇒ ASA
V I can be also considered specifically with respect to nomological and
dynamical properties. We can thus put forward the following two neces-
sary conditions for considering observables as objectively real properties of a
physical system:
1. VI of Nomological Properties (VINP): The valuation of the set of
nomological properties that constitute a physical system must be in-
variant under transformations of frames or coordinates.
2. VI of Dynamical Properties (VIDP): The valuation of the set of dy-
namical properties that constitute a physical system must be invariant
under transformations of frames or coordinates.
In QM, the algebra of observables is non-commutative. We will see that
even though the invariance of nomological properties (V INP ) is respected in
the formalism, valuations of dynamical magnitudes are not preserved under
rotations (failure of V IDP ) and thus we do not have, in general, VI in QM.
The physical consequence is that within the orthodox formalism of QM we
cannot globally define a physical system nor an ASA.
We say that the context B = {B1, . . . , Br} commutes with the context
A = {A1, . . . , As} if Ai commutes with Bj for all i, j,
AiBj = BjAi, 1 ≤ i ≤ s, 1 ≤ j ≤ r.
Recall that if A and B are two commuting self-adjoint operators, then there
exist a self-adjoint operator C and functions f and g such that A = f(C)
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and B = g(C). It follows that any LV defined over A is defined over any
commuting context.
Theorem 4.2 The only context commuting with A is A itself.
Proof: Let B be a context commuting with A. As we already know there
exist orthonormal bases {x1, . . . , xn} and {y1, . . . , yn} such that A is gener-
ated by {|xi〉〈xi|}ni=1 and B is generated by {|yi〉〈yi|}ni=1. Then, for every
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n we have,
|xi〉〈xi|yj〉〈yj | = |yj〉〈yj |xi〉〈xi|.
Multiply on the left in both sides of the equality by |xi〉,
|xi〉〈xi|yj〉〈yj |xi〉 = |yj〉〈yj |xi〉〈xi|xi〉.
This implies that xi is a multiple of yj . The result follows by the orthonor-
mality of the bases. 
Let v be a LV defined over a context A. In the previous theorem we
proved that a different context B does not commute with A, hence the
valuation may not be defined over B. Even more, we have the following
result,
Theorem 4.3 Let v be a LV defined over a context A and let x ∈ H be any
vector. There exists a rotation of x where v is defined and there exists a
rotation where v is not defined. In particular, valuations are not preserved
under rotations.
Proof: Assume that the dimension of H is greater that 2. Let v be a local
valuation defined over the context A. By theorem 3.2, we know that there
exists a vector y ∈ H such that v is not defined over |y〉〈y|. Clearly, if v is
not defined over |y〉〈y|, it is also not defined over |y′〉〈y′|,
y′ =
‖x‖
‖y‖y.
Given that ‖x‖ = ‖y′‖, there exists a rotation sending x to y′. Thus, v is not
defined over a rotation of x. Similarly, we can rotate x to a vector z such
that v is defined over |z〉〈z|. For example, take z as a common eigenvector
of the context A such that ‖z‖ = ‖x‖. 
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The previous theorem implies that under a rotation in H the valuation is
lost. Even though the vector x ∈ H is fixed, the coordinate system is
fundamental in order to valuate x. We must choose another valuation or
else the value of x may not be defined.
We are now in conditions to state the following No Dynamical Invariance
(NDI) theorem:
Theorem 4.4 (NDI Theorem) If the dimension of the Hilbert space H
is greater that 2, then the V IDP of a vector in H is precluded.
Proof: It follows from the failure of VI, Theorem 4.3. 
As a corollary of the NDI theorem above, we have that a vector in H cannot
be interpreted as describing consistently dynamical properties. This pre-
cludes the interpretation of a vector in terms of an objectively real state of
a physical system (or an ASA).
Summing up, in QM there are no invariant variations or dynamical mag-
nitudes which can be considered the same from different coordinate systems
due to the failure of the V IDP condition. As discussed above, only the
dynamical properties are capable of providing a dynamical description of a
physical system. What is most important in physics, change and variation,
is not accounted for by nomological properties. Only nomological properties
fulfill the objectivity condition with respect to vectors in H. As we have
discussed above this is a necessary but not sufficient condition to character-
ize a physical system —also the dynamical properties are necessary in order
to do so. Since it makes no sense to describe a system as possessing only
nomological properties, the orthodox interpretation of a vector as represent-
ing the objective real state of a (quantum) system is inconsistent with the
formalism of the theory.
The NDI theorem exposes an unfortunate common misuse of physical
concepts when interpreting QM. In many regions of the literature such no-
tions have become unacceptable oxymorons.
5 Consequences of the NDI Theorem
Since many foundational questions regarding the theory of quanta start their
analysis and discussions taking as a standpoint the first postulate of the
orthodox formulation our NDI Theorem has consequences for many ongoing
debates in the literature. For example, as Eugine Reich [30, p. 157] explains
—making reference to the PBR theorem— that Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph:
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“say that the mathematics leaves no doubt that the wavefunction is not just
a statistical tool, but rather, a real, objective state of a quantum system.”
This statement is false. As we have proven through the NDI theorem, the
PBR theorem is derived from a false hypothesis making its result untenable.
The seemingly inoffensive assumption that a vector can represent the state
of a physical system is —due to the NDI theorem— inconsistent with the
formalism of QM.
Another important consequence of our theorem regards the idea that it
makes perfect sense to consider, ΨU , “the quantum wave function of the
Universe”, or in other words, “the Universal wave function”. This idea was
first put forward by Hugh Everett in his Many Worlds (MW) interpretation
of QM.
“Since the universal validity of the state function description is as-
serted, one can regard the state functions themselves as the funda-
mental entities, and one can even consider the state function of the
entire universe. In this sense this theory can be called the theory of
the ‘universal wave function,’ since all of physics is presumed to follow
from this function alone.” [20, p. 9]
As we have seen above, even if one would admit such idea, it becomes com-
pletely vague and unclear what kind of Universe such approaches would be
talking about. In particular, the NDI theorem precludes the possibility that
such Universe is represented as an ASA. Even worse, since such Universe
would be described consistently only by nomological properties, it would
also be a completely static —uninteresting— Universe. But not only MW
interpretation can be subject of strong criticisms from the perspective of the
NDI theorem, also Bohmian mechanics might be analyzed following these
same lines of argumentation. As Michael Esfeld points out:
“The Bohmian law for the temporal development of the distribution
of matter in space is this one:
dQ
dt
= vΨt(Q)
In this law, the quantum mechanical wave-function Ψ has the job to
determine the velocity of the particles at a time t, given their position
at t. The wave-function can perform this job because it can with good
reason be regarded as referring to a property, namely a dispositional
property of the particles that determines their temporal development
by fixing their velocity.
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However, the wave-function that figures in [this] equation is the
universal wave-function; consequently, Q stands for the configuration
of all the particles in the universe.” [19, pp 9-10].
However, a more careful analysis should be provided in this respect, for
Bohmian mechanics changes the orthodox formalism of QM and might es-
cape in this way the limits of the first postulate and the NDI theorem alto-
gether.
Apart from theorems and interpretations, also some of the main prob-
lems of QM should be reconsidered taking into account what we have learnt.
In this respect, a well known discussion in the literature which seems to be
subject of the NDI-criticism is the problem of non-locaility, firstly suggested
by Einstein through a thought experiment at the 1927 Solvay conference in
Brussels. According to Einstein, if we accept that the quantum wave func-
tion provides a complete description of quantum particles then one can find
that, after their interaction and when taken apart, QM predicts a “spooky
action at a distance” between such quantum particles (see for discussion [3]).
As we have proven, the “if” assumed by Einstein is simply untenable in QM.4
The problem of non-locality rests on an assumption which is not consistent
with the orthodox formalism. Notice that the problem of non-separability
should be also reconsidered under this same NDI type-criticism.
Finally, we would like to remark that the problem of indistinguishable
quantum particles, which is today one of the main foundational discussions
in the literature, also takes for granted the first postulate. Within this de-
bate, philosophers of physics have been arguing for and against about the
distinguishability and individuality of “quantum particles”. Most part of
this debate rests, as we have seen, on an untenable interpretation of the for-
malism. One cannot interpret a vector as being an actual individual entity.
Due to failure of this interpretation the debate on identity and individuality
should be critically reconsidered. We attempt to do so in a forthcoming
paper [14].
6 Final Remarks
In this paper we have proven through the NDI theorem that the physical
interpretation implied by the first postulate of QM is inconsistent with the
orthodox formalism of the theory. In this respect, one might either still
4The fact that QM is not committed to this “if” was clearly acknowledged by Einstein
himself, as clearly recognized in a letter to Born dated 5 April, 1948. See: [7, p. 168].
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attempt to impose such metaphysical scheme to the formalism or simply
accept that the notion of physical entity has been playing the role of an
epistemological obstruction which avoids the possibility of understanding
the theory through new physical concepts [11]. The assumption that QM
talks about physical objects remains at this point of our knowledge —more
than once century after the creation of the theory— simply a metaphysical
presupposition that closes the door to a true development of the theory. In
this respect, we might recall Einstein’s considerations with respect to the
pernicious consequences of such dogmatic presuppositions regarding a priori
concepts:
“Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve
such an authority over us that we forget their earthly origins and ac-
cept them as unalterable givens. Thus they come to be stamped as
‘necessities of thought,’ ‘a priori givens,’ etc. The path of scientific
advance is often made impossible for a long time through such errors.”
[18, p. 102]
According to the authors of this paper we should accept that the notions
of ‘entity’ and ‘actuality (as a mode of existence)’ have been creations, cre-
ations that impose a limit to physical representation, and that these limits
seem to have been broken by QM. On the one hand, for those who accept
the orthodox mathematics of QM, the use of concepts that do not match
the formalism will only generate badly posed problems. On the other hand,
the literature is full of new experimental and technological developments
[4, 9, 26, 27] which should encourage us to develop new physical concepts
that would allow us to represent and coherently think about such fascinating
new phenomena.
A mathematical formulation with no clear connection to physical con-
cepts is only mathematics, it is not physics. This is why, from a realist
stance, we are still in need to recover physical representation of QM and
provide an answer to the question: what is the physical meaning of a vec-
tor in Hilbert space? We believe that the first step in order to find such a
coherent interpretation should be to acknowledge which interpretations (of
a vector in Hilbert space) are, due to the mathematical formalism, clearly
precluded.
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